Since the start of the current war with Iran, many Israelis have been asking how it can be that the same IDF which is now dominating the skies over Tehran and intercepting more than 90% of Iran's ballistic missiles, failed so miserably to protect Israel's borders on October 7, when more than 1,200 Israelis were killed or murdered within a single day by Hamas, supposedly Israel's weakest enemy. In my article for @unherd I offer an uncomfortable answer: that the Israeli Air Force's grandiose achievements thousands of miles away, and the military's collapse on the Gaza border two-and-a-half years ago, are two sides of the same coin; the end result of a years-long strategy of focusing on Iran as a singular and unique "existential threat", while dismissing the Palestinian issue as a nuisance, a mere distraction from the danger building up in Tehran. This strategy originated with Prime Minister Netanyahu, but was shared by many others in the Israeli political system and defense establishment. It affected the allocation of resources, the nature of intelligence assessments, and much more. Asking whether it was right strategy, or a blunder, is necessary not just in light of what eventually happened in Gaza and Tehran, but also because right now, while the eyes of the world are on Iran, a crisis on the Palestinian front could once again erupt. unherd.com/2026/03/bibis-exi…

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